Two Generals. One People: Divided by Power and Proxy

Understanding Sudan’s Descent into Civil War – And What It Means for the Region

Sudan Explained

Sudan, once rich with post-revolutionary promise, has spiralled into one of the world’s worst and most underreported humanitarian disasters. At the heart of the most recent crisis stand two generals: one commanding the national army, the other a paramilitary force, and one nation now fractured by power, betrayal, and foreign interference. But this is not only a tale of personal ambition; it is a chronicle of democratic betrayal, foreign manipulation, and geostrategic exploitation.

A History Written in Coups

Under British and Egyptian colonial rule via the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899–1956), Sudan gained independence in 1956, already burdened with internal divisions chiefly between the Arab-Muslim north and the Christian and animist south, triggering cycles of war and political instability. These divisions were exacerbated by British colonial policies that economically marginalised the south while privileging the north, laying the foundation for internal strife and future civil wars. The discovery and concentration of valuable resources, particularly oil in the south, further deepened inequality and tensions between the two regions.

Since independence, more than 15 coups have toppled Sudan’s government, making it one of the most coup-prone countries globally. Military regimes have repeatedly quashed civilian aspirations for democracy, protecting a militarised elite resistant to reform.

The First and Second Sudanese Civil Wars (1955–1972, 1983–2005) claimed more than two million lives. These wars were driven not only by identity-based tensions but fuelled by competition over the natural resources of the south,  particularly oil, arable land, and water. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement eventually led to the secession of South Sudan in 2011- the youngest country to date, but peace has remained elusive, and tensions persisted.

The Bashir Doctrine

Omar al-Bashir’s 1989 coup entrenched three decades of authoritarian rule relying on radical Islamist ideology, violent repression, and a divide-and-rule approach. Key to this was the use of proxy militias like the Janjaweed, employed during the Darfur Conflict. The RSF - Rapid Support Forces - evolved from this legacy, later formalised under Bashir and notorious for atrocities in Darfur. The first two years of the conflict claimed over 200,000 lives, with countless reports of sexual violence, killings, ethnic cleansing and displacement. Bashir likewise empowered regional warlords and militias, including two individuals who would later become central to Sudan’s most recent descent into violence: Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo.

Hemedti, once a camel trader from Darfur, rose to power as the Janjaweed’s commander under Bashir during the early 2000s. His loyalty, brutality, and control of key gold mines, especially the Jebel Amer region, earned him political and financial capital. A 2015 report found that Hemedtis forces were generating $54 million a year from Jebel Amer. In 2013, Bashir formalised the RSF under Hemedti’s command, giving him autonomy and a formal rank within the state security apparatus. From there, he built an independent empire: exporting gold, recruiting fighters for Gulf wars, and embedding his forces into national security, eventually positioning himself as Bashir’s insurance policy against coups until he helped stage one.

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, a career officer in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), rose through the military hierarchy during Omar al-Bashir’s three-decade rule. The general played a role in the brutal Darfur campaigns and later oversaw Sudanese troops deployed to Yemen under the Saudi-led coalition. Known for his loyalty to the military establishment and his ties to Egypt, Burhan was appointed Inspector General of the Army and eventually became the SAF’s top commander.

Bashir’s two most powerful allies ultimately inherited his architecture of repression, with the SAF serving as the country’s formal military and the RSF, which evolved from the Janjaweed militia, functioning as Bashir’s paramilitary force and was used to suppress dissent and shield the regime.

The Revolution Betrayed

Sudan’s 2019 revolution, driven by women and youth, was sparked by the rising cost of bread, fuel, and other essential goods, which quickly escalated into nationwide protests demanding democratic reform and an end to Bashir’s corrupt and brutally repressive regime. In a pivotal turn, both the SAF and RSF turned against Bashir, orchestrating his ousting in April 2019. 

The revolution ushered in hope for a democracy. A transitional council was established, and Abdalla Hamdok was appointed Prime Minister. Yet, Burhan and Hemedti held the real power. Despite Hamdok’s attempts to mitigate Sudan’s extreme economic turmoil, Burhan and Hemedti’s uneasy alliance was shattered in 2021 with a joint coup that ended the transition and suspended the constitution and with that, the Sudanese people’s hope for a democracy. International institutions, including the World Bank and the IMF, paused direly needed debt relief and aid, further straining Sudan, resulting in mass demonstrations demanding a civilian return to governance. 

Though briefly reinstated under international pressure, Hamdok resigned in early 2022, as Sudanese protestors were dissatisfied with the terms of his reinstatement and the violent actions of security forces who had repeatedly beaten and killed protestors. Since then, Sudan has functioned without a civilian government, with Burhan operating as de facto Head of State. Talks throughout 2022 aimed to restart the democratic transition; however, they ultimately failed due to unresolved tensions between SAF and RSF.

The Final Fracture

Negotiations throughout 2022 over the future of Sudan culminated in the December 2022 deal laying ground work for a 2 year transition into a civilian leadership including national elections, although many citizens rejected the plan due to contested time frames, security forces retaining post transition state powers and the failure to hold both Burhan and Hemedti, among other security figures, accountable. The December 2022 Framework Agreement, however, proposed integrating the RSF into the national army, a contentious issue as Burhan sought an integration within two years; Hemedti demanded a ten-year transition effort. Their alliance crumbled with tensions escalating on April 15th  2023 - a war erupted between SAF and RSF.

Who Are the Warring Generals?

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan Heads the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).  A career soldier, Burhan rose through the ranks under Bashir, becoming a prominent figure in the Darfur campaigns and later chair of the transitional Sovereignty Council. A military loyalist with deep ties to Egypt

Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo  leads the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group born from the Janjaweed militias.  Hemedti, once a camel trader, turned warlord, became one of Sudan’s wealthiest men through control of gold mines and deals with Gulf states, supplying mercenaries for the Yemen war and guarding borders for Europe. Hemedit became one of Sudan's wealthiest men by seizing and weaponising control of Sudanese gold abundance, enriched through gold smuggling and foreign contracts. In February 2025, he and allies unveiled a draft constitution promoting decentralisation and secularism.

Tensions Escalating: 

Both the RSF and SAF have accused each other of initiating the attacks of April 2023. Since the conflict has engulfed the country. The involvement of Russia’s Wagner group, including various foreign military influences, notably with reports of the UAE and Gulf States as well as Iran, has deepened the rivalry at the core of Sudan’s crisis illustrating the deep seeds of great power dynamics and proxy influences, with Sudanese liberty, democracy and security at risk. 

Fighting and incidents of violence across the country continued to rise, including in Darfur, with renewed accusations of genocidal attacks against minorities on behalf of the RSF. In June 2024 alone, 235 fires had been set in villages across Sudan. 

The SAF and RSF have employed distinct tactical approaches: the SAF relies on airpower, artillery, and formal military structure with support from Iranian drones and foreign training, while the RSF utilises guerrilla-style raids, rapid urban mobility, and proxy militias, especially in Darfur, to counter the SAF’s aerial advantages. Both forces have used starvation, siege warfare, and the destruction of infrastructure as tools of war, with hospitals, water stations, and aid convoys deliberately targeted.

Several NGOs and human rights organisations have documented a series of mass atrocities, prompting accusations of ethnic cleansing and war crimes.  In November, RSF forces killed more than 800 people in Ardmata, western Darfur, the UNCHR warning that current violence is emblematic of the Darfur Genocide, which killed an estimated 300000 people between 2003 and 2007. 

Proxy War and a Nation in Flames: 2023–2025

Both sides blame the other for igniting the conflict; however, foreign hands are evident. Russia’s Wagner Group, the UAE, Iran, and Egypt have all been implicated, turning Sudan into a battlefield of global and regional rivalries. 

On March 8th, 2024, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution calling for an immediate cessation of violence, to which the SAF agreed to indirect negotiations with the RSF mediated by Libya and Türkye. Talks, however, broke down on the 11th of March 2024, following significant advances on behalf of the SAF toward recapturing major cities near the capital, with reported Iranian support in the form of armed drones. 

Coordinated offensives on behalf of the SAF saw seizures of significant territory from the RSF in the latter half of 2024, for the first time since the outbreak of the war. As 2025 encroached, fighting in Khartoum intensified with the SAF retaining key areas surrounding the capital, driving RSF forces out of Omdurman, recapturing vital oil refineries in the north of the capital. Likewise, the 2-year siege of Obeid, a strategic city with railway connections to Khartoum, was ended by the SAF. 

In western Sudan, the RSF has continued its attacks on rebel forces, SAF personnel and civilians, while El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, remains the centre of fighting between the SAF and RSF, with targeting of non-Arab ethnic groups.

In early 2025, the RSF leadership, with allies, gathered in Nairobi to create a “parallel government”, signing a charter outlining key aspects of a post-war government, including secularism, democracy and a decentralised structure under a unified national army, with the RSF signing the new constitution in March.  

Simultaneously, the Sudanese government filed a complaint to the ICJ, accusing the UAE of complicity in genocide due to its reported support of the RSF. The case was thrown out in a 14-2 vote in early May 2025, with the court citing a lack of jurisdiction and being precluded by its statute from taking any position on the merits of the claims by Sudan. 

What Do the People of Sudan Face Today?

Before April 2023, 15.8 million people already needed humanitarian aid. Two years later, that number has doubled: 30.4 million Sudanese now require urgent support. Over 12 million people have been displaced, marking the largest and fastest displacement crisis in the world, and Sudan now represents the largest humanitarian crisis ever recorded.

Civilians are under constant threat: indiscriminate bombing, ethnic cleansing, mass displacement, and systematic sexual violence. Tens of thousands have been killed. Aid workers are targeted, and famine is rapidly spreading.

Approximately 31% of the population (15 + million people) are facing acute food insecurity. More people in Sudan are experiencing catastrophic hunger than the rest of the world combined.

• Casualty toll: over 150,000 killed 

• Displacement: Over 15 million are internally displaced, and millions more are in Chad, CAR, Eritrea, and South Sudan. Floods between June and September 2024 further displaced over 172,500 people and contributed to cholera outbreaks.

• Health Crisis: 80% of hospitals in conflict zones are non-operational, and famine and ethnic violence intensified, especially in Darfur.

• Ethnic cleansing and war crimes are rampant, with entire villages burned and hundreds of thousands displaced.

A Collapsing Health System

With the ongoing conflict, the healthcare system in Sudan is disintegrating, with health officials warning that the damage is likely to reverberate for decades to come. The WHO has verified 119 attacks on healthcare between April 2023 and October 2024, with over 80% of hospitals in conflict zones non-operational. Cholera outbreaks have surged, with over 60,000 cases and 1,600 deaths reported from August 2024 to May 2025. Reports likewise include outbreaks of measles, polio and dengue fever.  Some 3.4 million children under five face epidemic disease risks, while mental health needs are increasing, particularly among children fleeing violence. 

Women and Children at Risk

Gender-based violence has soared. Intimate partner violence, sexual exploitation, trafficking, and maternal health crises have left women and girls particularly vulnerable. 80 % of displaced women lack access to sexual and reproductive healthcare, with maternal deaths spiking. Anna Mutavati, UN Women Regional Director for East and Southern Africa, has stated that “Women in Sudan are enduring the gravest forms of violence, particularly sexual violence, while being systematically excluded from peace processes.” With 90% of recent Sudanese refugees in bordering Chad being women and children, their safety and dignity remain precarious. 

The Geopolitical Chessboard

Sudan’s war is not merely a domestic power struggle but is deeply enmeshed in a wider geopolitical chessboard, where global and regional powers exploit the conflict to pursue strategic, economic, and ideological interests. The civil war is a proxy battlefield, drawing in regional and global powers competing for influence and resources. 

Eritrea has reportedly allowed the SAF to use its territory for troop movements and training, reinforcing the army’s western and northern fronts. South Sudan has attempted to act as a neutral mediator, but internal factions have aligned with Sudanese counterparts, complicating Juba’s position. The Central African Republic (CAR), with its porous border, has seen the RSF use its territory for gold smuggling and as a recruitment and logistical hub, while Kenya,  though less directly involved militarily, has hosted diplomatic engagements and opposition figures, including Hemedti’s Nairobi meetings in 2025 to form a “parallel government.”

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have been accused of backing the RSF, attracted by Hemedti’s control over gold and mercenary networks. On the other side, Egypt and Iran are believed to support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), with Iran allegedly supplying drones that have shifted the military balance in favour of the SAF. Russia, through the Wagner Group, has historically partnered with Hemedti in gold smuggling and military training operations; however likewise maintains diplomatic ties with the SAF and appears to hedge its bets through Iranian cooperation. Meanwhile, the European Union continues to fund migration control efforts via Sudan, despite widespread human rights abuses, while international organisations like the UN and African Union are effectively paralysed by political divides, rendering coordinated peace efforts ineffective.

Eritrea:  SAF uses the territory for  troop movements and training Reinforces the western and northern fronts	Egypt: Purportedly backs the SAF, viewing Burhan as a strategic ally. Concerned about spillover instability and Nile water security. Sudan remains an ally for Egypt concerning the GERD dispute with Ethiopia.
South Sudan  Positioning as a “ neutral mediator” Internal factions  Ties with SAF regarding oil exports  RSF gold smuggling	Central African Republic Porous borders enable recruitment and logistical hub for the RSF
Iran: Reportedly supplies drones and arms to the SAF. Strengthens ties with Sudan as part of its regional counter-Western axis.	UAE & KSA: Allegedly, funds, arms and indirect support the RSF. Interested in gold exports and regional influence.
Russia Simultaneously maintains formal diplomatic relations with the SAF. Likely coordinates indirectly with SAF via Iranian supply channels. Strategic aim: Hedge its involvement to preserve both political leverage and economic access regardless of who wins.	Wagner Group (Russia) Extracts gold through RSF-linked networks to bypass sanctions. Offers security training and mercenary support to RSF.
European Union (EU): Funds externalised border management through Sudan, despite the conflict. Prioritises migration control over human rights obligations.	United Nations (UN) & African Union (AU): Stalled by global divisions, Security Council vetoes, and regional rivalries. Efforts to mediate peace have been ineffective due to a lack of unity and leverage.

Regional Stability: A Conflict Beyond Borders

Sudan’s location at the crossroads of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, with access to the Red Sea and control over the Nile’s key junction in Khartoum, makes it a vital regional hub. Bordering seven countries and featuring diverse landscapes, Sudan’s stability directly affects regional security, water resources, and trade routes across East Africa.

The ongoing civil war has unleashed a destabilising ripple effect: massive refugee flows, arms trafficking, and proxy conflicts threaten fragile neighbours. Chad, hosting over a million Sudanese refugees, faces rising ethnic tensions and resource strain. South Sudan risks renewed conflict as factions within its fragile peace process align with Sudanese actors. Egypt views Sudan’s instability as a threat to its control over the Nile and broader regional security. Eritrea and Ethiopia remain wary of spillover, while Libya’s role as a negotiation broker is complicated by its internal divisions.If the war continues, Sudan could trigger a wider regional crisis marked by state collapse, prolonged displacement, and intensified foreign competition for influence in the Horn of Africa.

What Now?

Sudan’s collapse is not merely internal, but it reflects decades of foreign meddling, militarisation, colonial legacies, and failed diplomacy. As the world’s worst humanitarian crisis unfolds, silence and inaction are complicity.

If peace is to be possible, it must be driven not by generals or proxies, but by Sudan’s people: courageous, defiant, and determined.

The future of Sudan belongs to its people, especially its youth, who envision a sovereign, just, and democratic nation free from the shadow of militarised proxies. 

Sudan bleeds not because of its people, but because of the systems that have thrived off their division, from colonial resource extraction to modern proxy warfare. If there is to be a future, it must be youth-led, justice-driven, free of proxies and sovereign for the people of Sudan. Only through inclusive dialogue, justice, and international solidarity can Sudan emerge from this darkness.